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本帖最后由 !感-杠-问? 于 2012-10-1 21:43 编辑
翻译原版文章如下(译文版权由我所有,望交流,望指正):
The Evolution of Credibility
科学研究“真理化”的过程
By: Frederick Grinnell | February 1, 2011
The winding path that an interesting result takes to become a bona fide discovery is just one of the topics covered in this new book on the practice of science.
新书自荐。关键词:科学应用;摘要:通过曲折的方式,有趣的研究结果最终成为理论与真理。
When I was a graduate student in biochemistry at Tufts University School of Medicine, I read an abridged version of Montaigne’s Essays. My friend Margaret Rea (a.k.a. Marci Trindle) and I spent hours wandering around Boston discussing the meaning and implications of the essays. Michel de Montaigne lived in the 16th century near Bordeaux, France. He did his writing in the southwest tower of his chateau, where he surrounded himself with a library of more than 1,000 books, a remarkable collection for that time. Montaigne posed the question, “What do I know?” By extension, he asks us all: Why do you believe what you think you know? My latest attempt to answer Montaigne can be found in Everyday Practice of Science: Where Intuition and Passion Meet Objectivity and Logic, originally published in January 2009 and soon to be out in paperback from the Oxford University Press.
当我还在塔夫茨大学医学院(Tufts University School of Medicine)攻读生物化学研究生的时候,阅读了蒙田(Montaigne)《随笔集》的简化版。当时,我和朋友玛格丽特·李(Margaret Rea,又名Marci Trindle)在波士顿游曳了好几个小时,讨论了蒙田随笔的意义与内涵。马歇尔·蒂·蒙田(Michel de Montaigne)居住在16世纪的法国波尔多(Bordeaux)附近。他当时住在一座城堡中。蒙田的文学创作都是在城堡西南方的一座高塔内完成的。这座塔其实就是个图书馆,馆藏超过1000本图书(该数字在当时可谓叹为观止)。他当时提出了一个问题:“我是何德何能?”说得明白些,就是“我为什么总觉得我知道的就是对的?”这值得我们深思。在我的新书《科学的日常应用:当直觉与灵感遭遇现世与系统》中,记述了我最近对于这一问题的思考。该书于2009年1月由哈弗大学出版社(Oxford University Press)初次出版,并将不久推出平装本。
Scientists tend to be glib about answering Montaigne’s question. After all, the success of technology testifies to the truth of our work. But the situation is more complicated.
科学家在回答蒙田的这一命题时,总是不加思考地轻描淡写。他们总觉得,如今的科技成果足以证明“我知道的就是对的”。然而,事实可并不这么简单。
In the idealized version of how science is done, facts about the world are waiting to be observed and collected by objective researchers who use the scientific method to carry out their work. But in the everyday practice of science, discovery frequently follows an ambiguous and convoluted route. We aim to be objective, but we cannot escape the context of our unique life experiences. Prior knowledge and interests influence what we experience, what we think our experiences mean, and the subsequent actions we take. Opportunities for misinterpretation, error, and self-deception abound.
世界百态客观存在,理性客观的学者运用科学的方法发现并将他们联系起来,得出最终的结论。这就是人们理想化的科学发现过程。看似轻巧的过程在科学的日常应用中,就会发现经常困难重重、举步维艰——现实总比理想来得更为复杂。我们总试图理性客观,然而却无法回避每个人独特的生活经验的干扰。每个人都有不同的观念习惯与兴趣爱好,各自的生活经验、人生感悟、做事方式也就不尽相同。世界周遭从而充满了各种曲解、错漏与误导。
Consequently, discovery claims should be thought of as protoscience. Similar to newly staked mining claims, they are full of potential. But it takes communal scrutiny and acceptance to transform a discovery claim into a full-fledged discovery. This is the credibility process, through which the individual researcher’s me, here, now becomes the community’s anyone, anywhere, anytime. Objective knowledge is the goal, not the starting point.
所以,各种最新科学发现都应辩证视之。像新近标记的新矿一样,这些发现都仍具诸多不确定性。然而,公众对于权威的信任制造了不是真理的真理。这就是将学者个人的“时间、地点人物”推广到社会集体的“任何时间、任何地点、任何人物”的过程。学者个人是客观性的终点,而不应是主观性的起点。
Once a discovery claim becomes public, the discoverer receives intellectual credit. But, unlike with mining claims, the community takes control of what happens next. Within the complex social structure of the scientific community, researchers make discoveries; editors and reviewers act as gatekeepers by controlling the publication process; other scientists use the new finding to suit their own purposes; and finally, the public (including other scientists) receives the new discovery and possibly accompanying technology. As a discovery claim works its way through the community, a dialectic of interaction and confrontation between shared and competing beliefs about the science and the technology involved transforms an individual’s discovery claim into the community’s credible discovery.
当个人的主张成为公众的真理之时,学者自身荣获了聪慧的奖誉。与新矿的发现不同,学者个人的主张到社会集体的真理的过程,则完全不受“真理”发现者的控制。在复杂的科学产业的社会结构中,不同的主体各司其职。研究员负责理论发现,编辑及审稿像看守一般负责控制出版物制作,其他科学家再将出版物的理论运用到自己的论文中,社会(包括科学家)最终看到了最新研究并将其应用到现实技术中。在个人主张成为公众真理的过程中,辩证法充当重要作用。它将与该主张相关的科学技术理论——无论统一抑或是对立——都一同融入新主张之中。
Two paradoxes infuse this credibility process. First, scientific work tends to focus on some aspect of prevailing knowledge that is viewed as incomplete or incorrect. Little reward accompanies duplication and confirmation of what is already known and believed. The goal is new-search, not re-search. Not surprisingly, newly published discovery claims and credible discoveries that appear to be important and convincing will always be open to challenge and potential modification or refutation by future researchers. Second, novelty itself frequently provokes disbelief. Nobel Laureate and physiologist Albert Szent-Györgyi once described discovery as “seeing what everybody has seen and thinking what nobody has thought.” But thinking what nobody else has thought and telling others what they have missed may not change their views. Sometimes years are required for truly novel discovery claims to be accepted and appreciated.
但是,这种真理化的过程本身却是矛盾的。其一,科学成果通常总是聚焦于那些主流观点认为存在谬误的东西。几乎没有一个成果是重复论证现实世界深信不疑的东西的。他们的目标是“学术创新”,而不是“重复研究”。因此,最新发表的科学研究,以及那些看似正确且重要的理论,自然都是未来科学家挑战的对象——在他们眼中,这些东西很有可能是有缺陷甚至完全错误的。其二,新奇事物本身总是很难被人接受的。诺贝尔奖获得者、生理学家奥尔贝特·圣捷尔吉(Albert Szent-Györgyi)曾经将科学发现描述为“视众所皆视、思众所未思”的过程。然而,“思众所未思”并将其公开阐述,很有可能意味着会遭到非议。有时,一个真理需要数年才能最终被接受认可。
In the end, credibility “happens” to a discovery claim—a process that corresponds to what philosopher Annette Baier has described as the commons of the mind. “We reason together, challenge, revise, and complete each other’s reasoning and each other’s conceptions of reason,” she wrote in a book with that title. In the case of science, it is the commons of the mind where we find the answer to Montaigne’s question: Why do you believe what you think you know?
反正最终,科学研究实现就“真理化”了。而这种“真理化”的过程伴随着哲学家安尼特·拜尔(Annette Baier)所定义的“大众观点”。在她的定义中,写道:“我们相互质疑,挑战、修正、完善对方的论证过程及观点。”就科学界而言,正是大众观点回答了蒙田的问题:我为什么总觉得我知道的就是对的?
Frederick Grinnell is Professor of Cell Biology at UT Southwestern Medical Center, where he has been on the faculty since 1972. He divides his time between doing science and reflecting on what doing science means. Everyday Practice of Science was shortlisted for the Royal Society Prize for Science Books 2010.
作者弗雷德里克·格林内尔(Frederick Grinnell)是德州大学西南医学中心(UT Southwestern Medical Center)的细胞生物学教授。从1972年起,他就在该中心工作。在他科研的同时,也试图回答科研本身的内涵。《科学的日常应用》一书名列《2010年科学书籍皇家科技奖》(Royal Society Prize for Science Books 2010)。 |
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