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本帖最后由 tangbirui 于 2011-3-28 23:20 编辑
The great unknown 不确定性之重
Can policymakers fill the gaps in their knowledge about the financial system? 政策制定者能弥补对金融系统认知的不足吗？
Economics focus 经济聚焦
Jan 13th 2011 | from PRINT EDITION
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IN THE depths of the Great Depression, Presidents Hoover and Roosevelt had to set economic policy on the basis of information that decision-makers today would consider pathetic. Along with manufacturing output, factory employment and department-store sales, they counted the number of freight wagons transported by rail. As a result America subsequently developed national accounts, which try to measure the economy better, using concepts such as gross domestic product.
在大萧条最为严重的时候，胡佛总统和罗斯福总统不得不靠着仅有的，当今政策制定者都觉得可怜的一点点信息来制定经济政策。除了计算工业产出，工厂就业率和百货商场销售额外，他们还计算铁路运输的货车数量。结果，美国后来开发出一系列的国民经济核算指标，用国内生产总值等概念来更准确地衡量经济状况。
The world has since invented a vast array of financial and economic statistics and the processing power to crunch them. Yet policymakers are today in a similar position with regard to the financial system. New “macroprudential” bodies have been tasked with maintaining financial stability, such as the European Systemic Risk Board (which has its inaugural meeting next week) and America’s Financial Stability Oversight Council. But the crisis exposed vast gaps in knowledge. From conduits and subprime-related securities to the regulatory-capital-enhancement swaps written by AIG, there was a bewildering list of financial exotica that played a significant role in the meltdown.
自那以后世界各地出现了一系列繁繁总总的金融和经济统计指标，和研究这些指标的处理能力。然尔就金融系统而言，政策制定者今天的处境和过去差不多。新型的“宏观审慎”机构，像欧洲系统风险委员会（下周正式成立）和美国金融稳定监管委员会，正为维持金融系统的稳定而努力。然而金融危机显示出对市场的认知还存在很大的缺陷。从管道投资和次级债相关证券到AIG承销的为改善法定准备金的掉期合约，各种新奇的，令人眼花缭乱的的金融产品无疑和这场大灾难息息相关。
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB), a global club of regulators, have picked some priorities. Three things are at the top of the wish-list. First, system-wide measures of borrowing and “maturity mismatch”, where banks use short-term funding to buy long-term assets. As in the past, these were the root causes of the financial crisis. The world’s ten biggest banks more than doubled the size of their balance sheets between 2003 and 2007. As they made loans faster than they gathered customer deposits, banks plugged the gap by short-term borrowing, often from other financial firms. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 many banks faced severe difficulties rolling over this funding.
国际货币基金组织（IMF）和金融稳定委员会（FSB）—一个监管机构的全球性组织，已经开始考虑指定首要任务。有3件事是急需解决的。首先，设立整个金融系统内的关于银行债务和“到期日”不匹配的衡量标准，这种不匹配表示银行用短期借贷来购买长期资产。以过往经验来看，这些是金融危机的根本原因。世界范围内10家最大的银行的资产在2003年到2007年间膨胀了不止一倍。他们吸收存款远没有放出去贷款快，所以用短期借贷（通常从其他金融机构）来堵上这个漏洞。在2008年9月雷曼倒闭后，许多银行的融资链条面临断裂的危险。
The second priority is data on the links between big banks and other bits of the financial system. It was not just the investment banking giants that had exposures around the world. Many European institutions were up to their necks in securities linked to the American housing market. This suggests that more information is needed on banks’ exposures across borders and the concentration in underlying asset classes.
第二要务是主要银行间和金融系统其他节点之间的数据交换。不单单是投行巨头们在世界各地有敞口。诸多欧洲金融机构购买大量的美国房地产市场相关证券。这就是为什么要加强银行间跨国界敞口和专注于标的资产级别的信息交换。
The final priority is data on the “shadow banking system” which comprises non-bank financial firms that often slip below regulators’ radar. In the run-up to the crisis, regulated banks became too reliant on shadow banks for funding. Off-balance-sheet vehicles were used to create further layers of intermediation, making things even more opaque.
最后一项任务是关于“影子银行系统”的数据，影子银行指的是非银行金融公司，因此经常逃过监管者的眼睛。在危机爆发前夕，受监管的银行过度依赖影子银行来融资。表外资产工具的应用带来更多中间业务，使监管变得更为困难。
The IMF and FSB will report back in June this year. Some progress has been made. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), a club of central banks, has used its data on international banking to develop a measure of maturity mismatch. But this is restricted to banks, and covers only their international activities and on-balance-sheet positions; and, as the euro-zone crisis has shown, the BIS data can also be difficult to interpret.
IMF和FSB今年6月将对已经采取的措施的进展作出报告。国际清算银行（BIS）— 由各国央行组成的组织—已经用国际银行业的数据来设计到期日不匹配的衡量标准。但这仅限于银行间，并只对他们的国际收支和表内资产进行审查；更有甚者，就像欧元区危机所揭示的，BIS的数据也有失真的时候。
To get a better handle on global banks, the FSB has developed a common reporting template, which will identify exposures to different financial sectors and national asset markets. Persuading banks actually to fill it in may be harder: widespread consultation will be needed and there are confidentiality and legal issues to grapple with.
为了更好地掌控国际银行，FSB设计出一般性的报告模板，可以确认银行在不同金融部门和不用国家资本市场上的敞口。然而让银行以实相告或许更难：要进行全方位的磋商，还要考虑保密性和许多法律问题。
The shadow banking system poses a thorny problem too. The IMF is trying to measure the problems of sectors where data do not exist or are sparse: for instance, for hedge funds, money-market funds and over-the-counter derivatives. This will require twisting the arms of financial firms that currently do not report data. Until then, the most severe gaps may be in the most leveraged parts of the financial system.
影子银行同样让人头疼。IMF试图衡量那些无法获得数据或很少数据的部门的问题：例如，对冲基金，货币市场基金和场外交易衍生产品。这意味着强制目前没有提交数据的金融公司上报数据。但在这之前，最大的缺口还是在金融系统中杠杆率最高的部分。
Paul Tucker of the Bank of England worries about the threats to financial stability that are created from outside the regulated sector and wonders whether the “regulatory perimeter” should be widened to encompass such institutions. That would allow regulators to supervise these firms, but would also give policymakers better information.
英格兰银行的PAUL担心非受监管机构会威胁金融稳定性，并考虑是否扩大监管范围，把这些机构也也包括进去。这样可以让监管者监督这些机构，但同样可以让政策制定者获得更准确的信息。
What you don’t know will hurt you 不确定性会对你不利
For all the effort expended on data gaps, the constant evolution and footloose nature of the financial system complicates matters hugely. As bank whizz-kids dream up new products, it will be hard for officials to keep up. Indeed, there is a good case that new financial techniques are created precisely because regulators cannot spot or understand them and therefore do not penalise them for being risky.
尽管为了获得精确的数据花了大量的精力，金融系统的不断创新和自由天性却使该过程变得非常复杂。银行业的天才小子们挖空心思设计新产品，官员们很难跟得上步伐。实际上，确实发生过监管者无法察觉或理解新型金融工具从而无法因为该工具风险太大而加以惩罚。
The insurance contracts that made AIG so entwined with the banking system were designed to help banks boost their capital ratios. The bundling of risky loans into complex securities was attractive for many firms precisely because they had low capital charges. Regulators, therefore, are not just in a race to keep pace with finance, they are in a constant battle to outwit it. The hope is that good market intelligence, for example discussions with clued-up investors, can help officials to become more savvy.
设计让AIG与银行业之间息息相关的保险合同的初衷是为了让银行提高自己的资本充足率。把高风险贷款和复杂的证券产品捆绑在一起可以吸引很多机构证正因为其很低的资本费用。因此，监管者不单要跟得上金融市场的步伐，往往还要比它更为智慧。幸好还能寄希望于优良的市场信息，例如与精明的投资者的沟通可以让官员们加强对市场的理解。
Yet imagine data nirvana: a colossal, constantly updating spreadsheet of the trading and lending exposures, cross-border activity, interconnectedness and funding risks of all regulated and unregulated institutions. Even if a few humans could get their heads around it—a collective nervous breakdown is more likely—they would still have to decide when to act.
但是想象一下海量的数据：巨大的，不断膨胀的数据库里包括交易和借贷敞口，跨国界金融行为，机构之间互联互通和监管和非监管机构的融资风险等信息。即便有人能理顺所有的关系—更多的人会为之崩溃—他们也要考虑采取行动的时机。
In the run-up to the crisis policymakers and supervisors, like most other people, managed to rationalise bad things that were plain for all to see, such as inflated house prices and some banks’ rock-bottom capital levels. As Claudio Borio of the BIS puts it, “The main reason why crises occur is not lack of statistics but the failure to interpret them correctly and to take remedial action.”
在危机前夕，像其他大多数人一样，政策制定者和监管者成功地对所有人都能一目了然的异常现象，例如膨胀的房地产价格和一些银行地量的资本水平做出了合理的解释。就如BIS的CLAUDIO所说的那样，“金融危机的主要原因不是缺少统计数据，而是没有正确地理解该数据从而采取补救措施。”
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发表于 2011-3-28 19:39
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