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报告题目:  Making classical zero knowledge protocols secure against quantum attacks
3\[.JXg+g!u{/PB 　报告人: Pranab Sen
y%[6Cn.PCQ/V)pR School of Technology and Computer Science
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I0wI&A9F3V Z"d3u Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, India  
0@Vx"YMSH{ 报告时间: 2008-05-07 15:30
Q!n)M)i2r 报告地点: Room 4-603, FIT Building, Tsinghua University
/PX nR(z*`0W2}O9g 主办单位:  Tsinghua University )y)F*l/n}VVo/C
　　简介: A zero knowledge protocol is an interactive proof whereby a prover can convince the verifier of the truth of a statement with revealing any additional information about the statement. The zero knowledge condition should hold even when the verifier cheats, that is, it deviates from thew{E+E*~0UEp
prescribed protocol. The possibility of making quantum computers begs the question as to what happens about the security of a zero knowledge protocol if the verifier cheats quantumly. Since problems like factoring and discrete logarithm which are at the heart of many classical }Qd |Jh
cryptosystems and protocols become tractable in the presence of quantum computation, it is a priori conceivable that a cheating quantum computer can break the security of a classical zero knowledge protocol.}#h2Kc2T[{IB(b[C*Z
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Nevertheless, in these talks, we shall see that any problem that has a classical zero-knowledge protocol also has, under a reasonable condition, another classical zero-knowledge protocol which is secure against all classical and quantum polynomial time verifiers, even cheating ones.  This answers an open question of Watrous, and generalizes classical results on zero knowledge by Goldreich, Sahai and Vadhan, and Vadhan.-X+XQ"\K*q5S/|
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This is joint work with Sean Hallgren, Alexandra Kolla and Shengyu Zhang, and will appear at the ICALP 2008 conference.

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