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摩根斯坦利：美国衰退的全球骨牌效应 'snP+mRb
2008-03-27 00:00:00
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　　提要：如果美国经济确实陷入衰退，将对其他地区及其货币产生影响。这种骨牌效应将有四条可以并行不悖的推进路线：首先，在投资者普遍避险的时期，经常项目赤字国的货币将下跌；第二，随着“英美式债务和住房周期”的震荡，与美国的金融体系和债务周期相似的国家将受害；第三，如果美国经济疲软确实损害到全球经济，那么初级产品价格会回落，初级产品出口国货币会受害；第四，最明显的路线是美国减速通过贸易打击其他国家。 %~t s$Q tQ

&X)d%V,Iy$X0SN 　　（外脑精华·北京）最新数据显示，美国实体经济确实在减速，其金融市场也继续承受着沉重压力。但另一方面，在美国之外，大多数经济体的宏观经济数据却依旧出人意料地保持着良好走势。
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@bS lo,v"V 　　本文提出，如果美国经济确实陷入衰退，就会对其他经济体及其货币产生影响，而这种骨牌效应将有四条可以并行不悖的推进路线。首先，在投资者普遍避险的时期，经常项目赤字国的货币将下跌。其次，随着“美英式债务和房地产周期”走向下滑，与美国的金融体系和债务周期相似的国家将受到打击。第三，如果美国经济疲软确实损及全球经济，那么初级产品价格可能会触顶回落，初级产品出口国的货币也可能受到影响。第四或许是最明显的路线，即美国经济减速通过国际贸易影响世界其他经济体。
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　　需要强调的是，本文只是列举了一些概念性问题，以供投资者思考。由于当前存在严重不确定性，因此我们无法预测在上述四条路线之中，哪一条将率先启动、以及哪一条将占据主导地位。我们希望，本文能为投资者提供初步的思考材料，用以预测未来的骨牌走势。0L
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　　美国衰退骨牌效应的四条推进路线 6Q
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　　本文主旨不在于挑起关于经济脱钩问题的争论，而在于分析美国经济减速的影响。[KK
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0lt.{p9G@+YR 　　我们的观点是：美国经济减速对世界其他经济体的影响固然不可否认，但本次冲击的强度会小于以往。但另一方面，全球金融危机的深化和蔓延以及世界实体经济通过贸易链条受到的负面冲击最终将影响到各经济体的货币。n T't y;^b
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　　此刻，美国是唯一一个正在下滑的大经济体，而美联储是唯一一个正在大力降息的央行。而且，随着极端避险时期的结束，美元走势疲软，因为其上涨动力不足以弥补利差的影响。0Q j)LRC8TS5Q
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　　然而，未来几个月之中，随着美国衰退这副“骨牌”开始倒下，外汇市场的走势或许会发生急剧变化。这副骨牌将有四条可以并行不悖的推进路线。
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　　第一条路线：经常项目赤字。随着全球金融市场收紧、流动性日益稀缺，经常项目存在庞大赤字的经济体的货币将较为脆弱。随着全球投资者避险趋势的加强，相比其他货币，土耳其里拉、波罗的海三国货币、新西兰元、南非兰特甚至澳元等货币都比较容易受到打击。
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　　第二条路线：美英式金融结构。英国、澳大利亚、新西兰、西班牙、爱尔兰和印度等国都具有“美英式金融结构”，即美英式金融体系以及很高的借贷杠杆、对房地产泡沫的介入程度较深。相比其他国家，这些国家更容易受到打击。美国房地产市场的一个突出特点在于，房价调整并没有明显的诱发因素，而是“重力”导致房价从过高的水平上回落。既然美国如此，那么那些与其相似的国家也没有理由不会出现同样的情况。
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　　第三条路线：初级产品。初级产品的价位已处于极限水平。不仅其绝对价格已经很高，而且全球经济减速的背景也说明了这一点。如果美国经济下滑确实导致全球经济大幅减速，那么初级产品价格和初级产品出口国的货币都将面临下滑的风险。t2gL/cTA1F
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　　第四条路线：国际贸易。读者大多很熟悉这条路线，因此本文不作专门论述。
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　　德国和日本经济显示强大适应力
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qf@$fddhn\ 　　关于骨牌推进路线的走向，投资者和分析家习惯上认为，骨牌将由美国、欧元区等大经济体启动，而后向韩国、土耳其等小经济体推进。但情况未必如此。
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　　我们曾指出，德国和日本不仅是出口大国，而且侧重资本品出口。德国方面，在其对欧洲货币联盟之外经济体的出口总额之中，对亚洲的出口占30%，份额高于对美出口（份额为25%）。日本的情况也和德国类似，亚洲吸收了其出口总额的50%。相比之下，美国市场所占的份额只有17%；事实上，2002年美国在日本总出口中所占的份额还高达33%。因此，只要亚洲和其他新兴经济体的投资增长推动其资本品进口保持强势，那么相比过去的情况，德国和日本就会更有能力抵御美国经济减速的不利影响。换言之，欧洲、日本的经济走势或许需要更长的时间，才会与正在减速的美国经济趋同。
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fN]4Q5Q'LPi3B 　　英文原文：Four Fall-Lines for the Dominos5gp t'Y6S7b.Y3i

*F4T/QB3Tv Summary and Conclusions
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Recent data suggest that the US real economy is indeed slowing and its financial markets remain under severe strain. However, the macroeconomic data for much of the rest of the world （RoW） continue to surprise on the upside. In this note, we argue that, if the US does indeed fall into a recession, there will be repercussions for the RoW and their currencies. But this domino effect could follow four - not mutually exclusive - fall-lines. First, in times of broad risk aversion, we could see the currencies of current account （C/A） deficit countries weaken. Second, as the ‘Anglo cycle’ of debt and housing falters, the economies with financial systems and debt cycles similar to those of the US may suffer in turn. Third, if indeed the global economy is infected by the weakening US, commodity prices may put in a top, and commodity currencies may suffer. Fourth, perhaps the most obvious fall-line is how a slowing US economy could affect the RoW through trade.
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l3s0DRRgg,Lr)y We stress at the outset that this note lays out some conceptual issues for investors to consider. There is frankly too much uncertainty for us to predict, at this point, which of the four fall-lines will occur first or will be the dominant one of the four. Our hope is that this note will provide some preliminary food for thought for investors in anticipating how the chips may fall in the period ahead.Bv.pY @

5lUs3?;D2haK,U9o The Dominos Will Fall
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We do not have any intention of raising the debate of economic de-coupling in this note. Our position should be familiar to regular readers of our work: while the impact of a slowing US economy will no doubt, with a delay, be felt by the RoW, the magnitude of the shock may be more modest this time around, compared to the previous episodes. But the deepening and the broadening of the financial crisis in the world, along with the negative shock to the real economies of the world through trade, should ultimately have implications for currencies."r'Okm]d
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At this point, when the US is the only economy in the world that is slowing, and the Fed is the only central bank that is cutting aggressively, and with risk aversion no longer at its extremes, the dollar has weakened, as the 'Dollar Smile' has not been powerful enough to fully compensate for the yield deficit of the US.
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)~9XN k*Vo~ ~w In the coming months, however, the trends in the currency markets may be quite different, as the 'dominos' start to fall. There are four main fall-lines we see. They are not mutually exclusive:;g:P!B#w/DI

["|(_P_8y[.B:h%kFJ -- Fall-line 1. C/A deficits. As the global financial markets tighten up and liquidity becomes more scarce, on a global basis, the currencies of the economies with large C/A deficits could be more vulnerable. The TRL, Baltic currencies, NZD, ZAR and even the AUD could be more vulnerable than other currencies as global risk-taking retrenches further.Ne`+ZA#xoj
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-- Fall-line 2. Anglo financial structure. Countries such as the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Spain, Ireland and India that have the 'Anglo financial structure', i.e., the Anglo financial system as well as high leverage and high exposure to frothy housing markets, may also be more vulnerable than other countries. The remarkable feature about the US is that there was no obvious trigger for the housing price correction: housing prices began to fall because of gravity. This raises the question why the same process could not take place in these other economies. Fv
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-- Fall-line 3. Commodities. Commodity prices are at extreme levels. This is remarkable not just because of the high absolute prices but also the fact that the global economy is decelerating. If indeed the global economy slows meaningfully because of a weak US, then there will be downside risks to commodities and commodity currencies.*m(C$~(x4W6xY HnW

/V&yOzyBZ/F.gQ -- Fall-line 4. External trade. We will not elaborate on this particular channel, as it should be familiar to most readers.
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In short, we propose four not mutually exclusive fall-lines for the dominos.bM)Akh+^^
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Why Germany and Japan Seem So Resilient V9H4c9i0|B

wV9~&Y7XK)j#eXa6cE In thinking about the order of the dominos, investors and analysts may have the habit of going from large economies （the US and Euroland） to smaller ones （Korea and Turkey）. But this may not be appropriate. In previous work we’ve done, we pointed out that Germany and Japan are not just large exporters, but are specialists in capital goods exports. Further, for Germany, exports to Asia now account for around 30% of non-EMU exports - exceeding the 25% or so heading to the US. Similarly, for Japan, some 50% of total exports go to Asia, compared to 17% heading to the US. This latter figure, in fact, has declined from 33% as recently as 2002. Thus, as long as capital goods imports - mostly driven by investment - remain strong in Asia and other emerging economies （or ‘Second World’ countries）, Germany and Japan could continue to exhibit greater resilience to a US slowdown than historical patterns suggest. Thus, for Euroland to recouple with the US, we may need to see the Mediterranean economies weaken further to alter the view of the ECB. For Japan, we will need to see China and the rest of Asia slow, and for domestic demand to slow, before we see a meaningful deceleration in headline GDP. In any case, my colleagues in Europe and Japan have the view that both economies will slow materially this year. We merely provide one hypothesis to help explain why it may take a bit longer for these two economies to re-couple with the US.'d!Oo)L Fz8b^@
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Bottom Line :P0`'CE,Xkk

.[?.x0v1pa\w We try to consider how the 'dominos' could fall in the months ahead, as the US slows. While there are too many uncertainties for us to be committed to one particular scenario, we propose four possible fall-lines for the dominos. These possible paths are not mutually exclusive.
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#vcY Y3|2p8S 来源：摩根斯坦利，2008.03.17，作者：Stephen Jen

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您所查看的帖子来源于考研论坛(bbs.kaoyan.com) Thus, for Euroland to recouple with the US, we may need to see the Mediterranean economies weaken further to alter the view of the ECB. For Japan, we will need to see China and the rest of Asia slow, and for domestic demand to slow, before we see a meaningful deceleration in headline GDP. In any case, my colleagues in Europe and Japan have the view that both economies will slow materially this year. We merely provide one hypothesis to help explain why it may take a bit longer for these two economies to re-couple with the US.Q!t-\)Wy&F\-h
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We try to consider how the 'dominos' could fall in the months ahead, as the US slows. While there are too many uncertainties for us to be committed to one particular scenario, we propose four possible fall-lines for the dominos. These possible paths are not mutually exclusive.
lbtf*Jz     因此，只有地中海沿岸国家的经济遭到进一步削弱，欧洲中央银行才会改变其态度。在我们观察到这种变化以前，欧洲经济不会与美国经济步调一致。至于日本，除非发现中国和亚洲其他国家经济放缓，以及日本内需下降，否则日本GDP总量不会有重大减速。总之，我欧洲和日本的同事们都持有一种观点，今年欧洲经济和日本经济都会不可避免地放缓。我们只不过提出一种假设，以便解释为什么这两大经济体需要更长的时间，使其重新与美国经济同步。
anEwr 基本观点+h@s&^9N2`1z
  美国经济放缓碰倒了第一张多米诺骨牌，我们希望在骨牌效应完全呈现前的几个月时间里预测其走势。由于存在太多的不确定因素，我们无法肯定某一种具体的情况，于是我们提出了四条有可能的多米诺效应路线，这四条路线也可能同时出现。+NEJL0Tk

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最后这两段没有翻译,在下试着补上.
m/S)OE%t+|2p 献丑,请指教!

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